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Introduction 
 
Since the 1980s, two alternative approaches for financing and organizing pensions for 
older people have emerged across developing regions. These are: (1) contributory 
schemes, taking the form of capitalized individual accounts, usually managed by 
private firms; (2) government funded non-contributory “social pensions” provided on 
either a means-tested or universal basis. Both these approaches are influential in Latin 
America, where they have often come to replace long-standing defined benefit 
schemes. Indeed, Chile was a pioneer of the first approach, implementing a reform in 
1980, and it continues to be seen as a model for pension reforms in countries as 
diverse as Nigeria and India. Since the 1960s, Brazil has developed a substantial 
social pension programme which runs alongside contributory schemes for protected 
workers. More recently, social pension programmes have become more widespread in 
Latin America, including new and enlarged schemes in Mexico, Colombia and 
Argentina.  
In some countries these two approaches have been developed in tandem, 
comprising two separate “pillars” of an integrated pension system. Theoretically, 
social pensions can operate as a welfare safety net for people who fail to accumulate 
sufficient reserves to obtain a decent contributory pension. Bolivia is a case in point. 
In 1996 the government implemented a combined reform which saw the conversion of 
existing schemes into privately run capitalization schemes. At the same time, using 
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finances from the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the government established 
a new, universal social pension programme: Bono Solidario (Bonosol). Since that 
time, Bonosol (and its successor Renta Dignidad) has received considerable 
international attention and is considered by many to be a model of best practice for 
pension policy in low income countries (Willmore 2007). Less attention has been paid 
to the new contributory system, but most evaluations are less than positive about its 
achievements (Fretes-Cibils et al. 2006). 
This paper compares the effectiveness of Bolivia’s social pension and its contributory 
system as tools of income security for older people. We focus on several aspects of 
their performance: coverage of older people, cost and financial sustainability, 
administrative efficiency and effects on income distribution. The next section 
summarizes key elements of the two approaches, reviews international experiences 
and identifies policy challenges. We then provide some relevant context for the 
Bolivia case study, before examining the performance of each model. Comparing 
these distinct approaches within a single country provides important policy lessons, 
particularly for low-income countries. The chapter draws on a wide range of 
secondary and grey literature, as well as interviews with key policymakers.  
 
<H1>Contributory versus Non-contributory Pension Models in Latin 
America</H1> 
 
Latin America was a pioneer region in the introduction of contributory pension 
programmes, with funds for a wide range of occupations dating back to before the 
First World War (Mesa-Lago 1978). Across this region, the middle decades of the 
20th century saw continued extensions to pay-as-you-go (PAYG) contributory 
pension provision for new sectors of the formalized labour force. This was closely 
associated with economic models of state-led industrialization and the growing 
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political leverage of labour unions representing formal sector workers. By the 1980s 
both the economic model and the model of contributory pension expansion entered a 
period of prolonged crisis (Mesa-Lago 1989). The failings of Latin America’s 
contributory pension schemes included limited coverage of workers outside the 
formal sector of the economy and growing indebtedness, due to failures to maintain 
equilibrium between contributions and liabilities. This financial imbalance had a 
range of causes, including high rates of evasion, poor returns on investments, 
corruption, excessive administrative costs and unrealistic entitlements (such as low 
retirement ages and, in some cases, high pension values). At the same time, 
government bail-outs made contributory pension schemes highly regressive, 
redistributing wealth from informal sector workers to the most highly paid formal 
sector workers. This added to the region’s notorious rates of income inequality. 
Since the 1980s, most Latin American countries have attempted to implement 
radical contributory pension reforms. Chile led the way in 1980, obliging new entrants 
into the workforce to take out pension plans with private fund managers rather than 
with the state pension scheme (Barrientos 2004a). These new private funds were 
organized on a fully capitalized basis, thus breaking the financial imbalances of the 
old state-run schemes. The Chilean reforms were initially viewed as successful, with 
pension investments generating high rates of return (Vittas and Iglesias 1992). Within 
a few years, they had inspired a new “Three Pillar” model of pension governance 
championed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a range 
of other influential development agencies (World Bank 1994; Charlton and 
McKinnon 2001). 
In much of Latin America, pension privatization and the Three Pillar Model 
have yielded disappointing results and have attracted much criticism (Müller 2003; 
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D’Haeseleer and Berghman 2004). First, it quickly became clear that an effective 
private pension market requires strong state regulation. There is evidence from a 
range of developing countries that many private funds charged exorbitant 
management fees, as well as channelling large amounts of finance into marketing and 
advertising their products (Dobronogov and Murthi 2005; Riesco 2005). Second, in 
many countries, rates of return for private pension investments have been erratic, 
falling short of reformers’ optimistic predictions. In recent years, even the World 
Bank has accepted that the global instability of financial markets, and especially in 
developing countries, threatens the long-term reliability of returns through a worker’s 
contributory lifespan (Orszag and Stiglitz 2001). This has been manifested during the 
current global economic crisis, which has led to sharp losses on pension fund 
investments in developing countries ranging from 8 to 50 per cent in 2008 (World 
Bank Human Development Network 2009). Third, the loss of younger workers to new 
private pension funds left state pension schemes with members who were close to 
retirement or already receiving pensions. Governments were required to directly make 
up for the lost contributions of younger workers, which meant that public spending on 
pensions actually rose rather than fell. In Chile, for example, these costs are estimated 
to have been equivalent to 4 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) annually 
between 1980 and 2000 (Edwards 1998). Fourth, claims that greater public faith in the 
transparency of private management would lead to increased participation have not 
borne fruit. In many countries, shrinking formal sector employment has led to falls, 
rather than rises, in pension coverage (Barrientos 2004b) whereas workers in the 
informal economy rarely contribute to pension funds.  
By the start of the 21st century, the credibility of the Three Pillar Model had 
diminished, although similar reforms were still being discussed or implemented in 
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parts of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, a new reform agenda began 
to emerge, highlighting the potential of non-contributory “social pension” schemes for 
providing income security for the poorest old people (HelpAge International 2006). 
Within Latin America, increased attention came to be paid to the Brazilian approach 
to pension provision. This combines contributory schemes for formal sector workers 
with a substantial set of social pensions for retired workers and the urban poor. 
Studies of Brazil’s combined approach claim that it not only reduced poverty among 
older people, but that benefits were shared across entire households, and could 
contribute towards family solidarity and improved health and education outcomes 
(Schwarzer and Querino 2002; Lloyd-Sherlock 2007). In the case of Brazil, 
entitlements to social pensions and the rural pension depended on claimants’ labour 
history or were means tested. This was to contrast with the model Bolivia has more 
recently adopted. Here, uniquely in Latin America, non-contributory pensions were to 
be offered on a universal basis, regardless of labour history or individual economic 
circumstances. 
 
<H1>The Bolivian Setting</H1> 
 
If middle-income countries such as Argentina and Mexico struggled to establish 
universal contributory pension programmes, the prospects for achieving this in 
Bolivia have always been remote. Table 9.1 compares a range of development 
indicators for Bolivia and selected countries from the region. Bolivia remains one of 
the poorest countries in Latin America, with a small formal labour market (Klein 
2003). Poverty is especially concentrated in rural areas (UNDP 2007) and among the 
country’s indigenous population, who according to Bolivia’s 2001 census constitute 
62 per cent of the population.2 According to the Bolivian National Statistics Institute, 
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83 per cent of the working population was engaged outside the formal sector in 2007 
(INE 2013). The contrasts between Bolivia and richer Latin American countries are 
less apparent in terms of population ageing. The country’s experience of demographic 
transition has been broadly in line with Brazil and Mexico’s, giving rise to similar 
proportions of populations in older age groups. High rates of poverty, limited 
economic opportunities and a growing older population increase the need for policies 
promoting income security in later life. It is claimed that poverty, running at 49 per 
cent according to ECLAC (2009a), is particularly concentrated among Bolivia’s older 
population, with rates of 59 per cent among people aged 60 and above (Clark 2008).3 
[Insert Table 9.1] 
Economic instability represents a major challenge to the financial equilibrium of 
contributory pension programmes. Ideally, funds should be able to achieve reasonably 
stable rates of return on investments over a period of several decades. During the 
1980s, as in much of Latin America, Bolivia experienced a number of severe 
economic crises. The most serious of these was a hyperinflationary shock in 1984/5. 
Since 1987, the economy has seen consistent growth, with rates of between 3 and 5 
per cent in recent years (World Bank 2013). Theoretically, this sustained economic 
performance should facilitate the performance of contributory pension financing. The 
hyperinflationary recession of the mid-1980s was mainly caused by a massive fiscal 
deficit, a shrinking economy and the country’s inability to pay its foreign debt (Green 
1995). As elsewhere in Latin America, the crises of the 1980s gave rise to a major 
reorientation of economic policy, away from state-led protectionism to radical neo-
liberalism (Grindle 2003). Key elements of the new neoliberal model were 
privatization of state-owned enterprises and efforts to develop the country’s minimal 
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financial markets. Contributory pension reform was viewed as an essential part of this 
strategy, although it was only introduced in the mid-1990s. 
Despite generating stable economic growth, the social achievements of the 
neo-liberal model were very limited, as reflected in enduring rates of poverty and 
limited formal employment opportunities. By the late 1990s, popular political 
opposition to the ruling regime started to gather pace, partly fuelled by mounting 
evidence of widespread corruption and a generalized disenchantment with formal 
party politics dominated by ruling oligarchies that shared the spoils of power through 
political patronage (Gamarra and Malloy 1995). This popular resistance included 
several high-profile rebellions across rural and urban areas, with increased political 
activism among indigenous groups and coca leaf growers led by one Evo Morales 
(Crabtree 2005). In 2005 these currents of opposition led to a dramatic political shift; 
the election of Evo Morales as leader of the left-wing pro-indigenous Movement 
Towards Socialism (MAS). The following years have seen a series of political crises, 
including regional conflicts over taxation and control of natural resources. In 2009 a 
new national constitution was agreed, and this contained a range of universal welfare 
guarantees, including universal pensions for older people. Despite Morales’s anti-
capitalist ideology and the current global crisis, the Bolivian economy has continued 
to grow by 5.2 per cent in 2012 (World Bank 2013). In large part, this has been due to 
the exploitation of new large gas deposits, which has generated large amounts of 
public revenue through tax and royalties (Catena and Navajas 2006). 
 
<H2>Contributory pensions in Bolivia</H2> 
 
Bolivia’s contributory pension schemes were established later than in most other 
countries in the region, and on a more limited basis. In 1957, with the support of the 
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International Labour Organization (ILO), a number of small funds were brought 
together into a single state-run national pension programme. As elsewhere in Latin 
America, this programme was financed on a PAYG basis. However, one unusual 
feature was that unions and other professional groups were permitted to set up 
parallel, voluntary “complementary pension funds”. These resembled the Third Pillar 
of the World Bank model, although workers were not allowed to choose their 
complementary fund. Together, these programmes only covered around 11 per cent of 
the workforce by the mid-1990s (Escobar and Nina 2004). 
By the 1980s, both the main state fund and the top-up complementary ones 
had begun to register substantial deficits. Pension values were fixed (defined benefit), 
irrespective of variations in contributions, and the retirement age was just 55 for men 
and 50 for women.4 By the 1980s, growing numbers of affiliates were reaching 
retirement, so that the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries fell sharply: from 5.2 to 
2.7 between 1980 and 1995. Even then, a high proportion of contributors, both 
workers and employers, evaded payments, and little was done to police this. Finally, 
the pension funds levied excessively high administrative costs, averaging 17 per cent 
of total contributions, and it is alleged that the system suffered from widespread 
corruption (von Gersdorff 1997). For example, one complementary fund had invested 
substantial amounts in a loss-making nightclub that provided free entertainment to its 
own managers (Revollo 2004). By the mid-1990s, the government was regularly 
bailing out the state pension system at average rates equivalent to 1 per cent of GDP a 
year. It was also making substantial discretionary payments to the complementary 
funds. As the numbers of beneficiaries continued to grow, it was clear that these 
deficits would rapidly worsen. 
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Pension reform was a high priority for the neo-liberal regime that took power 
in 1985. It was seen as a key tool for regaining control of public finances, reducing 
labour costs and developing financial institutions. At the same time, international 
financial institutions exerted considerable pressure for reform (Kohl and Farthing 
2009). Despite this, there was a delay of several years before changes were 
implemented, due to sustained resistance from labour unions and public sector 
workers (Müller 2008). It was necessary to set up a new government department, a 
Ministry of Capitalization and Pension Reform, which was allowed to operate 
independently of the pro-union Ministry of Labour (Revollo 2004). The contributory 
pension reform was finally enacted in 1996. The state scheme and complementary 
funds were completely replaced with immediate effect by a new fully capitalized 
programme financed entirely by workers’ contributions.5 According to one of the 
reform’s designers, “the vision was clear: leave poverty behind, by attracting large 
capital investments, creating internal savings” (Revollo 2004: 8). 
It was planned that the new pension system would initially be run by just two 
private sector organizations, selected through a process of international bidding.6 
Limiting the number of operators was justified in terms of the small size of the 
potential pension market and a need to limit marketing costs. Despite the neo-liberal 
tenor of the reform, competition was to be phased in slowly. Each firm was allocated 
monopoly rights for one of two geographical areas with equal populations. By 2000 
affiliates would be entitled to move between these funds, and in 2004 new firms 
would be allowed to enter the market. In fact, there is little evidence that meaningful 
competition has developed. The products offered by each fund are very similar, few 
affiliates ever opt to switch and no new firms had been established by 2009.7  
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Like most other Latin American countries, the Bolivian reform of 1996 was 
strongly influenced by Chile’s pension privatization. There were, however, a number 
of features that made the Bolivian case stand out. Most other countries had 
implemented a “softer” version of the Chilean model, making greater provision for 
state participation and minimum pension guarantees. By contrast, two aspects of the 
Bolivian reform could be considered to be a more radical version than the Chilean 
model. First, the old pension funds were completely and immediately replaced by the 
new system, forcing all workers out of the PAYG system and into a capitalized one of 
individual saving accounts. Second, there was no minimum pension guarantee. 
The Chilean reform had permitted workers who were already affiliated to 
pension funds to remain within the old system. This meant there was a transition 
period between the old system being phased out and the new competing funds taking 
over the entire industry. In Bolivia there was no such transition, and even affiliates 
nearing retirement were obliged to join one of the private schemes. As a result, the old 
state and complementary funds were left with large numbers of pensioners, but no 
contributions, and government was required to fill this financial shortfall. The 
government was also required to transfer capital to the private funds to cover the 
contributions that affiliates had already made to the old schemes.8 Due to the low 
coverage of the old schemes, it was projected that these costs would be no higher than 
2.6 per cent of GDP (Revilla 2002). However, they had already reached 5 per cent of 
GDP by 2002. Among other causes, this was due to a decision to substantially 
increase the real value of pensions being paid out by the old system. Interestingly, this 
level of deficit was roughly equivalent to the projected costs of the unreformed 
system by 2002. 
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At the same time, the new private pension operators received substantial 
indirect state subsidies in the form of above market rate returns on government bonds. 
The limited development of Bolivia’s capital markets meant that there were few 
options for investing pension finances locally. To reduce overseas investments, the 
two funds were required to invest at least 65 per cent of their portfolios in treasury 
bonds. These generated guaranteed rates of return of 11 per cent a year between 1997 
and 2002, making the new pension industry a highly lucrative monopoly (Arze 
Vargas 2009). In later years, rates on government bonds were cut, but they continued 
to offer very generous terms. By July 2010, the combined assets of the two 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs) (private pension funds) were 
equivalent to over US$5 billion. The AFPs claimed that their rate of commission (set 
at 0.5 per cent of affiliates’ salaries) was substantially lower than most other pension 
systems in Latin America (Interview with the AFP Previsión Fund manager, July 
2010). However, this does not include other fees. For example, AFPs charged 1.3 per 
cent of each monthly pension payment to beneficiaries as well as separate fees to 
government for the administration of pension funds. This was on top of other charges 
such as a varying percentage of each worker’s contribution to professional and health 
insurance (Interview with General Director of Pensions, Bolivian Vice-Ministry of 
Pensions, July 2010).  
The 1996 pension reform included important changes to pension entitlements. 
The standard age of retirement was raised to 65 for men and 60 for women. 
Expectations at the time of its introduction were that affiliates would be able to 
accumulate sufficient savings to allow for a minimum lifetime pension equivalent to 
70 per cent of the minimum monthly wage. The reality, however, is that many 
affiliates did not reach this savings threshold for a number of reasons, including 
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labour market instability that led to interruptions in employment and hence to 
interruptions in contributions. This is the reason why many formal sector workers 
such as teachers delayed retirement. In the case workers did not accumulate sufficient 
funds to finance a life-long minimum pension, the AFPs provided a minimum 
monthly payment equivalent to 70 per cent of the minimum wage but only until the 
insured’s accumulated funds in the individual account were exhausted.9 Once these 
savings were depleted, the pension was completely discontinued. As a result, 
pensioners faced a growing risk of suddenly losing benefits the longer they survived 
past 65, increasing the economic vulnerability of people in the oldest age categories. 
The only exceptions to this system were the military and senior members of the 
judiciary, who were given explicit guarantees that their previous generous pension 
benefits would not be reduced (Escobar and Nina 2004).  
It was predicted that the new pension programmes would be paying out at 
least 45,000 benefits by 2007, but the actual number was only 12,000 (Arze Vargas 
2009). In part this was due to the difficulty of satisfying the stringent retirement 
requirements. Also, large numbers of members had opted to delay retirement because 
the value of the capitalized annuity was substantially lower than their current 
salaries.10  
At the same time, the reformed system had performed poorly in terms of 
extending coverage by increasing affiliation. By 2002 coverage was roughly 11 per 
cent of the economically active population, which was no higher than that achieved by 
the old schemes. As a result, only 15 per cent of the population aged 65 and over 
currently receives a contributory pension of any kind. Fund membership is 
concentrated among higher-paid formal sector workers, with coverage of less than 3 
per cent for the rural population. Table 9.2 shows levels of inclusion by educational 
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status and income quintile. Only 0.5 per cent of the poorest 20 per cent of Bolivians 
were included in the new system. Even among the richest quintile of the population, 
the pension uptake is no higher than 30 per cent. This inability to attract more than 30 
per cent of people in the richest income quintile (for whom contributions would have 
been affordable) demonstrates the failure of the private firms to develop the pension 
market.  
[Insert Table 9.2] 
Given the concentration of coverage among the rich, and the heavy levels of 
direct and indirect government subsidy, it is evident that the capitalized pension 
system was highly regressive, distributing public spending away from poorer socio-
economic groups. Meaningful competition between private administrators has never 
been introduced, investments remained highly concentrated in treasury bonds and the 
prospects of the new scheme providing lasting income security to substantial numbers 
of pensioners was questionable. According to the World Bank, the failures of 
Bolivia’s reformed contributory system are mainly due to poor implementation, rather 
than shortcomings of policy design (Fretes-Cibils et al. 2006). Yet it is difficult to 
envisage how a capitalized contributory system could be made to work in the Bolivian 
context. Indeed, studies of other Latin American countries have reached similar 
conclusions (Mesa-Lago 2004; Arza 2008). 
Predictably, renationalizing the contributory pension programme featured 
prominently in MAS’s 2005 election campaign. Progress towards reform was initially 
slow, however, and it was not until late 2008 that a new pension law was approved by 
Congress, although it was never approved by a Senate that remained controlled by the 
opposition during the first government of Evo Morales (2006–9). Despite MAS’s 
radical ideological agenda, this law sought to modify the existing pension scheme, 
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rather than completely replace it. Its main proposals were that the pension age be 
reduced to 60, that new private administrators and competition be introduced and 
permitted to operate for no more than ten years and that regulation be strengthened 
(La Prensa 2008).11 Perhaps surprisingly – given the government’s radical rhetoric – 
no provisions were made for reintroducing employer contributions nor for the state to 
take over running the pension schemes, in spite of serious lobbying from the trade 
unions’ congress, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) and NGOs such as the Centro 
de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA) (Labour and Agricultural 
Development Centre). 
Following MAS’s landslide victory in the December 2009 general election, a 
more radical pension reform was proposed. This bill was ratified by the new 
plurinational assembly that replaced Congress with the implementation of the new 
constitution. It was also ratified by the Senate in December 2010 and implementation 
started in 2011. The new pension law (Law No. 65), stipulates that the national 
government completely take over contributory pension fund administration from the 
AFPs (Mendoza, 2013). The retirement age was set at 58 for men and between 55 and 
58 for women (VPSF 2010).12 The new scheme includes a Solidarity Component, 
which seeks to guarantee a minimum pension value for anyone who has made at least 
ten years’ worth of contributions. The calculation of the minimum pension uses 
sliding scales to take into account the total years and amounts of contributions. For 
affiliates with 30 years of contributions, this may be as high as 70 per cent of their 
average salary in the last two years of work.13 It is claimed that over 80 per cent of 
contributory affiliates will gain as a result of this scheme (Interview with the General 
Director of Pensions, Bolivian Vice-Ministry of Pensions, July 2010).  
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The costs of these guaranteed pensions will be met by the Solidarity 
Component. The solidarity fund will be created from a number of sources. As Table 
9.3 shows, there will be an additional contribution from workers (0.5 per cent). In 
addition, the new law introduces employer contributions at 3 per cent. On top of that, 
the solidarity fund will receive 20 per cent of the contribution made by workers 
towards accident insurance (around 1.71 per cent of their monthly salary in the private 
AFPs.) Finally, a variable contribution from the most highly paid workers has been 
introduced on a sliding scale, whereby those with salaries equivalent to 20 or more 
minimum wages pay 1 per cent of the excess, those with 40 or more pay 5 per cent, 
and those with salaries equivalent to 60 or more minimum wages (around US$6,000 
per month), pay 10 per cent to the solidarity fund. The value of the minimum pensions 
will be open to revision every five years. Table 9.3 also shows the relative weight of 
each of these four contributions to the solidarity fund, which is expected to reach 
US$140 million per year and represents an important redistributive component of the 
new pension system. 
[Insert Table 9.3] 
It is argued that the reform will promote equity within the contributory system, 
by redistributing resources to workers on low pay and to women with several children 
(Guillén 2010). Introducing a minimum pension guarantee will also bring the Bolivian 
contributory system closer into line with pension programmes elsewhere in Latin 
America. Renationalizing the contributory pension system is part of a wider trend in 
the region, including a high-profile reform in Argentina (see Hujo and Rulli in this 
volume). 
The current reform aims to transform the contributory pension system and do 
away with most of the key elements of the original neo-liberal reform. However, the 
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new system will remain very different to the one that operated before 1996. Pension 
financing will still operate on a capitalized model (albeit with a large solidarity 
element), employer contributions will be considerably lower (3 per cent compared to 
5.5 per cent) and the state will be exempt from any direct contributions (except as an 
employer for civil servants). In sum, the new Bolivian contributory system aims to 
reintroduce the state into the management of pension funds on a not-for-profit basis. 
This however, does not alter the capitalized nature of the pension model. 
Despite the new sources of revenue, the financial sustainability of the new 
system has been called into question. Since the value of pensions generated by the 
capitalized system has typically been equivalent to a replacement rate of 30 to 40 per 
cent, the level of funding needed to bring these up to the guaranteed minimum 
pension will be very substantial. The capacity to capture contributions from very high 
earners (either as tax or social insurance contributions) has also been historically very 
limited. It is also possible that employers will reduce their contribution liabilities by 
taking advantage of legislation that facilitates subcontracting, with subcontractors not 
being obliged to provide social protection coverage (Interview with CEDLA Senior 
Researcher in August 2010). In the face of these financial pressures, it is possible that 
the value of the minimum pension guarantee will be substantially reduced over time. 
 
<H2>Non-contributory pensions in Bolivia</H2> 
 
As part of the 1996 pension reform, Bolivia introduced a universal non-contributory 
scheme, Bonosol, to run alongside the new contributory funds. Rather than a monthly 
pension, Bonosol paid out an annual sum equivalent to US$248 to everyone aged 65 
years old or more. The scheme was to be financed from the proceeds of privatization 
of state enterprises.14 As such, it played an important political function in reducing 
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opposition to a wider programme of neo-liberal reform. The revenue generated by 
these privatizations (around US$41.7 billion) was placed in Collective Capitalization 
Funds (CCFs). These funds were entirely separate from the fully funded contributory 
pension accounts. Despite this, the same two private firms invited to manage the 
contributory scheme were brought in to manage the CCFs’ assets.15  
It was initially claimed that effective investment of the CCF funds would 
generate sufficient returns for Bonosol to become largely self-funded. This would 
permit annual payments to remain at US$248 for the first five years of the scheme, 
with revisions for further years. In fact, Bonosol only operated in its original form for 
a single year. There were two main reasons for its short lifespan. First, the CCF funds 
were insufficient to meet the full costs of the annual payments. In large part, this was 
because the legal procedures for conducting the sale of part of the capitalized 
companies to the private sector had not been completed before the presidential 
elections of 1997, forcing the fund managers to take out a US$45 million loan to 
cover the gap (Martínez 2004). Second, 1997 saw a change of political leadership in 
Bolivia, and the incoming administration preferred to be associated with a new 
programme. Between 1997 and 2000, Bonosol was suspended and was then replaced 
by a downgraded scheme known as the Bolivida. Under this new scheme, benefits 
were cut to US$60 a year, although back payments were made to cover the missing 
years of 1998 to 1999 (Molina 2007). The Bolivida was to be completely funded from 
the interest earned by the privately managed CCF, but, as with the contributory funds, 
this interest largely came from over-market rates of return on government bonds. As 
such, the scheme was essentially being funded by government, which also paid 
private firms a commission for running it. 
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The Bolivida lasted little longer than the original Bonosol. In 2002, following 
a further change of political leadership, the Bonosol was reinstated, with the benefit 
restored to US$248 a year (Müller 2008). It was claimed that these more generous 
benefits would be financed by the sale of shares in the CCFs, which would raise 
around US$90 million a year (Martínez 2004). The election of Evo Morales in 2005 
led to a re-evaluation of the Bonosol, and in 2008 it was replaced by yet another 
variant: Renta Dignidad. 
Renta Dignidad is a universal social pension that offers more generous 
benefits than those offered by its forebears. First, the age of entitlement has been 
reduced from 65 to just 60 years old, representing an additional 226,000 beneficiaries. 
Second, the value was increased to US$340 for people who lacked a contributory 
pension and US$257 for those who had one.16 It was estimated that this upgraded 
scheme would cost around US$190 million a year, considerably more than the rates of 
return generated by the CCF investments (only around US$25 million a year). By 
2008, the projected annual cost of Renta Dignidad was increased to US$260 million. 
The reasons for this substantial rise include a proposed increase in benefit values, a 
higher exchange rate for the Bolivian currency, and extra administration costs 
incurred in improving payment mechanisms. Most of this substantial shortfall is 
funded by a new local government hydrocarbons tax, along with general taxation and 
profits from nationalized companies (Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas 
Públicas2009). High prices for export commodities and discoveries of new 
hydrocarbons have rapidly increased this source of tax revenue and reduced political 
resistance from local governments (ECLAC 2009b). Despite its increasing cost, Renta 
Dignidad still represents less than 2 per cent of GDP: considerably less than direct and 
indirect government support for the contributory pension system.  
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By 2005, 676,000 Bolivians were aged 60 or over and were entitled to a Renta 
Dignidad benefit. Data from the National Pensions Office for 2008 indicates that over 
700,000 people received payments, and this figure climbed to 830,000 by 2012 
(Quispe 2013). Some opposition political groups have alleged that there are many 
fraudulent claims, although this has not affected the popularity of Renta Dignidad. A 
more practical problem for eligible claimants, especially in the rural areas, is their 
lack of identity cards, which makes it impossible for them to receive their social 
pension. In 2006, MAS implemented a large programme of enrolment in rural areas to 
maximize access to this benefit, but this programme was superseded in 2009 by the 
introduction of a new biometric fingerprint identification system in time for the 
December presidential elections that, it is claimed, will also help curb fraudulent 
pension claims. In spite of progress towards making Renta Dignidad a truly universal 
pension, local NGOs estimate that around 10 per cent of eligible people still lack 
identity documents and are therefore excluded from the programme, especially in 
rural areas and among monolingual Quechua and Aymara speakers.17 More generally, 
considerable efforts have been made to facilitate access to Renta Dignidad payment 
centres. Instead of annually, the benefit can now be collected at more regular 
intervals, such as on a monthly basis. Under the previous schemes, this had 
represented a major challenge for older people living in more remote rural areas. 
Since the introduction of Renta Dignidad, the government has enlisted the army to 
travel to the people instead and to distribute the benefit in rural areas, including the 
establishment of local telephone and banking services (Cedib 2008).  
It is striking that even the small proportion of older people who receive 
generous contributory pensions are also entitled to Renta Dignidad. On one hand, this 
may be seen as further support to an already privileged group. On the other, these 
 267 
payments ensure that Renta Dignidad can be portrayed as a truly universal benefit, 
rather than a means-tested one. This is useful for several reasons. First, means testing 
would run counter to the socialist ideology of the current regime. Second, these 
payments may theoretically give politically influential higher income groups a sense 
that they also have a stake in the Renta Dignidad programme and increase their 
support for its continuity as well as for other changes in social policies currently being 
introduced by the MAS government.18 Third, it might be argued that administering the 
process of eligibility might have been relatively expensive. However, it could be 
argued that the introduction of Renta Dignidad on a universal basis rests on the 
implicit acknowledgement of the failings of a contributory system that delivers very 
small pensions to the majority of this select group of beneficiaries.  
It is to be expected that by providing large numbers of older people with a 
reliable income stream, Renta Dignidad does much to promote economic security and 
well-being in later life. The value of the Renta Dignidad payment is now over US$1 a 
day for those who have no access to contributory pensions, and is therefore just 
enough to lift individual beneficiaries with no other sources of income over the 
official poverty line. However, there is considerable evidence from Bolivia and other 
developing countries that many older people are expected to share this benefit with 
other household members, especially where other income sources are scarce (Skinner 
2007; Clark 2008; Mejia Bastos and Dusseau 2008). On one hand, this may dilute the 
impact of the scheme on older individuals; on the other, it may be seen as spreading 
the benefits of Renta Dignidad across a larger section of the population: it is estimated 
that around a quarter of households contain a beneficiary (Skinner 2007). The 
experiences of many developing countries demonstrate the many difficulties of 
targeting social transfers, leading some to argue that universal social policies have a 
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better long-term effect than targeted ones in establishing social protection for all and 
in promoting inclusive development (Mkandawire 2005). In the case of Renta 
Dignidad, its benefits arguably go beyond poverty reduction. According to Skinner 
(2007), Renta Dignidad increases the visibility and participation of the poorest older 
people as full citizens and reinforces the intergenerational social contract. 
 
<H1>Comparing the Two Systems</H1> 
 
The Bolivian experience since 1996 clearly illustrates the respective capacity of 
contributory and non-contributory pension schemes to deliver income security to 
older people in low income countries. Put simply, it demonstrates that non-
contributory social pensions are much better suited to this task. By 2007, the 
contributory system paid out pensions to around 65,000 older people, of which only 
12,000 were paid by the new private scheme. In 2004–5, this contributory system 
absorbed around 5 per cent GDP in government subsidies, not including substantial 
indirect subsidies of up to 40 per cent of the annual transition costs through treasury 
bonds (Meléndez Howell and Alejandro Soto 2004). The high transition cost reflects 
the costs of switching from a PAYG to a funded system, and ultimately the ability of 
politically influential groups of relatively privileged workers to retain generous 
pension values paid out through the pre-reform system. This increases transition costs 
and hence outstanding government liabilities. By contrast, the social pension pays out 
over 830,000 benefits at a cost of less than 2 per cent of GDP. At the same time, it is 
to be expected that the social pension will significantly contribute to reducing 
poverty. Since it is not means tested, Renta Dignidad’s impact on income distribution 
will be less obvious. In recent years, Bolivia’s income distribution has improved, 
although it still remains very unequal by international standards. For example, 
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between 1999 and 2009, the share of national income held by the poorest two 
quintiles rose from 1.2 to 2.6 per cent (ECLAC 2013). The causes of this 
improvement are complex and, as in other Latin American countries, the relative 
contribution of cash transfers should not be overstated (Bertranou and Maurizio, 
2010). Nevertheless, high levels of poverty among older age groups suggest that the 
scheme will potentially improve the national distribution of wealth.19 For its part, the 
contributory system fails to reach poorer groups and leads to substantial redistribution 
of wealth towards the better off. The new reform will reduce inequality within those 
groups included in the contributory system, but will still lead to a redistribution of 
wealth from non-insured to insured groups (through state contributions for civil 
servants and by less direct forms of subsidization).  
For both schemes, financial sustainability fundamentally depends on the 
availability of public finance and the wider health of Bolivia’s economy. The 
Pensions Vice-Minister himself recognized that the sustainability of the pensions 
system as a whole is heavily dependent on future oil and gas revenues (Interview with 
the Bolivian Vice-Minister of Pensions, August 2010). 
In 2007 and 2008 tax receipts continued to grow rapidly, reaching an annual 
rate of 33 per cent of GDP (compared with an average of 19 per cent for Latin 
America and the Caribbean) (ECLAC 2009b). The global crisis of 2008/9 caused a 
sharp fall in these receipts, and this led to a decision to postpone a small increase in 
the benefit, which lasted until 2013 when Renta Dignidad was increased by a flat 
Bs50 per month.20 It was projected that gas and oil tax receipts and royalties would 
fall by around 17 per cent in 2009. In the event, according to official figures, income 
from hydrocarbons has increased steadily, and is projected to reach US$1,688 million 
in 2011 (Hidrocarburos Bolivia 2011). The central bank has been able to accumulate 
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substantial foreign reserves worth US$7.8 billion in 2008. Although fears existed that 
these may quickly be depleted if the wider economic situation did not improve, 
Bolivian GDP growth in 2009 was 3.4 per cent and foreign reserves increased to 
US$8.58 billion (ECLAC 2010a), rising to 5.2 per cent and 11.66 billion in 2012 
(World Bank 2013). This means that the Morales administration has not been forced 
to be more selective about its public spending priorities than it has been in the past, 
nor has it been forced into making politically costly trade-offs between contributory 
and non-contributory pensions.  
It is interesting to consider whether it is valid to portray the two pension 
schemes as fundamentally independent or as part of a single system. Both 
programmes were established by the same legislation in 1996, both were run by the 
same private contractors for a number of years and since the 2010 Pensions Law both 
are planned to be administered again by the state as part of a single system. In 
addition, both are heavily dependent on financial support from the state. In political 
terms, there were important links between Bonosol and the contributory pension 
reform, since the former was used to justify the lack of pension guarantee in the latter. 
More generally, by including Bonosol’s creation and the 1996 contributory pension 
reform in a single bill, the government sought to reduce opposition to pension 
privatization. According to Katharina Müller, “the Bonosol scheme was primarily 
designed to complicate opposition to pension privatization” (Müller 2008: 165). It 
could therefore be argued that they form elements of a single two-pillar pension 
scheme, whereby the non-contributory safety net compensates for the lack of a 
guaranteed pension from the contributory pillar. While the 2010 reform was 
essentially targeted at the contributory scheme, it is referred to as a new Integrated 
Pension System (Sistema Integral de Pensiones, SIP), which includes the contributory 
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scheme, a semi contributory solidarity element and a non-contributory universal 
pension (VPSF 2010). This is the reason why the government extols the virtues of the 
new system in terms of the solidarity transfer it provides from the richest to the 
poorest workers. In addition, this system aims to increase the coverage of the 
contributory system by opening it up and making it attractive to the self-employed, 
who can receive a modest pension with ten years of contributions.  
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for viewing these schemes as essentially 
separate. First, the flow of funds between the capitalized accounts and the non-
contributory system is limited. Second, there is little overlap between them in terms of 
their fundamental welfare and political objectives. The contributory pension scheme 
is mainly concerned with maintaining the political support of powerful groups of 
workers, with the development of local capital markets a secondary objective and old 
age income security barely registering as a third consideration. By contrast, Renta 
Dignidad is first and foremost a pro-poor welfare initiative, which also seeks to create 
a new social contract between more marginalized social groups and the state. As part 
of this, the two systems follow a different political logic. The contributory system has 
a long history and entrenched interests that guarantee its survival. By contrast, the 
universal pillar is the result of more recent political processes linked to legitimizing 
privatization (in the case of Bonosol) or tackling poverty and fostering social 
inclusion (in the case of Renta Dignidad). Whether this social contract survives the 
vicissitudes of the global economy remains very much to be seen. 
In sum, Bolivia has made steady progress in the provision of income security 
in old age through two types of provision – one contributory, the other non-
contributory – that were introduced in 1996 for very different purposes and obeying 
different priorities. The former followed neo-liberal reforms in the region that sought 
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to encourage the individualization of responsibility for financing old age pensions 
through a capitalized system that was supposed to free the state from funding 
obligations. In the event, state direct and indirect subsidies increased in the period 
following the introduction of this pension system. In the case of the non-contributory 
pension, a neo-liberal logic was also at play because it was provided as a sweetener in 
exchange for the privatization of state monopolies. Moreover, state commitment to 
the non-contributory pension between 1996 and 2005 was inconsistent. 
The arrival to power of MAS at the end of 2005 led to a complex period of 
policy reform that has been gradually implemented since 2011. The new regime 
immediately established a new universal non-contributory pension scheme, Renta 
Dignidad, which was upgraded in terms of its reach and value of the benefit. Reform 
of the contributory system has been more complex, but was finally passed into law in 
2010. In spite of demands from trade unions, the government has maintained the 
capitalized nature of this system, which has been in place since 1996. However, it has 
introduced a redistributive ‘solidarity’ element within contributory pensions and plans 
to increase the uptake of this type of pension among the self-employed, increasingly 
referring to both systems as part of an integrated whole. 
The most obvious lesson for other developing countries is that non-
contributory social pensions are a much more efficient means of meeting the welfare 
needs of older people than contributory schemes. Despite this, contributory pension 
schemes for privileged workers such as civil servants are ubiquitous, whereas large 
social pension schemes are few and far between. In countries where both exist, 
government spending on social pensions is usually a fraction of spending on 
contributory ones. The Bolivian experience also shows that contributory pension 
funds create powerful vested interests among privileged groups of workers who can 
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resist substantial reforms, even under radical non-elite governments. Only six years 
after Morales took office was the contributory system meaningfully modified, 
although many of its essential features remain. Similarly, Lula in Brazil was able to 
make little headway in reforming that country’s costly and inequitable contributory 
pension system (see Chapter 5 in this volume). Both Bolivia and Brazil have benefited 
from increased fiscal resources which enabled the extension of social pensions 
without threatening the vested interests of the contributory system. In many 
developing countries, the scope to do this is limited.  
 
                                                 
<H1>Notes</H1> 
1 The authors would like to thank Gabriela Barriga from the Corporación Minera de Bolivia 
(COMIBOL), James Blackburn from HelpAge and Lola Paredes from Fundación Xavier Albó for their 
help in locating key sources of information, without which this article would not have been possible. 
2 The figure of 62 per cent indigenous population is widely used in Bolivia by a government that 
presents itself as a government of the “indigenous majority”. The figure emerged from the 2001 census 
that included a question on ethnic self-designation. This issue has caused much debate in a country 
where some argue that there is no basis for declaring that Bolivians constitute anything other than a 
single mestizo group (Toranzo Roca 2008), whereas others argue that the ethnic and cultural 
“blindness” that characterized the country’s birth, and even the 1952 revolution, are responsible for the 
historical exclusion of the indigenous majority (Albó 2008).  
3 Poverty figures in Latin America show large variations depending on the measurement methodologies 
employed by the different international organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). In the case of Bolivia, moderate poverty 
ranges from 42.8 to 63.9 for 2004. In the case of extreme poverty, the figures are 23.9 and 34.7 per cent 
of the population respectively. See Helwege and Birch (2007). However, there seems to be agreement 
on the fact that Bolivia has seen a reduction in poverty in the last ten years (León 2008). 
4 The state pension promised pensions of around 30 per cent of a member’s last five years’ salary; the 
complementary funds offered 40 per cent. The early age of eligibility of benefits has to be understood 
in the context of a country with the second lowest life expectancy in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
which in 2010 was still 67 years (ECLAC 2013). 
5 Employers do make a 2 per cent contribution to a separate scheme for worker accident compensation. 
This compares to a 12.5 per cent contribution levied directly on workers. 
6 The two successful bidders were Invesco-Argentaria (Spain) and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV) 
(Spain). In 2000 BBV bought Invesco Argentaria and is now known as Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria (BBVA), which was required to sell its Bolivia pension operation to Zurich Financial 
Services. In Bolivia, they created pension funds known as AFP Previsión (that belongs to BBVA) and 
AFP Futuro (owned by the Zurich group). 
7 The first MAS government’s 2008 new pension proposal was passed by Congress but never approved 
by a Senate that was in the hands of the opposition. That proposal made provision for the involvement 
of additional private firms in the administration of pension funds to deliver effective competition to the 
existing AFPs. However, since the resounding victory of MAS in December 2009, a new pension law 
was approved by the new plurinational assembly (Congress) and the Senate in 2010 that effectively 
removes private AFPs in favour of a single state administrator. The transition was originally planned to 
take place in the course of 2011, as established by the new Pensions Law. By 2013 this had not yet 
taken place, partly due to the opposition of the trade unions (Xinhua 2013). 
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8 The old pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system entered into a period of financial problems due to poor 
administration, demographic changes and fraud. Eventually the state had to subsidize it and, by the 
time the system was transformed into its capitalized form in 1996, the pension system had funds for 
less than six months. The state now compensates individuals who contributed to the old system but are 
retiring in the new one. Projections estimate that state contributions will peak in around 2025 and then 
decline rapidly until the death of the last pensioner who requires compensation for contributions to the 
pre 1996 system (Interview with the Bolivian Vice-Minister of Pensions, August 2010). 
9 Those who had not made enough contributions to cover the costs of a pension worth at least 70 per 
cent of the minimum wage for the rest of their lives if they retired at 60 or 65 would be paid a pension 
worth 70 per cent of the minimum wage until the money in their personal fund had run out. This was 
based on their actual contributions plus interest to the new capitalized regime, along with a notional 
value allocated to the contributions they had made to the pre-1996 PAYG regime. Because they 
received nothing from the contributory system, many people who found themselves in this position 
(especially women, who had had more interruptions to their working lives and who were meant to 
retire at 60) would delay retirement. 
10 For example, the Bolivian Vice-President of Pensions and Financial Services claimed that 10,000 
school teachers had to postpone their retirement since the value of their pensions would only be around 
a third of their salaries (Lazcano 2010).  
11 The regulatory framework in the 2008 pension proposal permitted state intervention where capital 
loss in pension funds reached 20 per cent. 
12 The retirement age for women will depend on the number of children they have. It will be one year 
less than 58 for each child up to a maximum of three. Special workers’ groups such as miners are to be 
offered lower retirement ages (between 51 and 56 years old) and a more generous scale of pension 
values. It is claimed that few miners reach the retirement age and most receive disability pensions at 
younger ages. 
13 The reform proposes fixed replacement rates (relative to average salaries for the two years previous 
to retirement) of between 56 and 70 per cent for people who contributed for between 16 and 35 years. 
There will be a fixed minimum benefit (currently set at US$187 a month for those with 35 years of 
contributions) as well as a maximum ceiling (US$345 a month). For people with between ten and 20 
years of contributions there will no fixed replacement rate, but they will be offered a guaranteed benefit 
value ranging from about US$68 to US$96 a month. These amounts will be revised every five years.  
14 Half the sale value of these state enterprises was sold to private investors and the funds generated by 
this sale was placed under the management of private fund managers. 
15  These firms charge a commission for managing their total portfolios made of the contributory 
pension capitalization account as well as the Collective Capitalization Fund. These commission rates 
are set on a sliding scale that depends on the size of the combined size of the accounts and range 
between 0.2285 per cent for accounts up to US$1,000 million to 0.0067 per cent for accounts between 
US$1,200 and 1,500 million, with no commission thereafter (AIOS 2003).  
16 This corresponded with a monthly benefit of Bs200 and 150 respectively. In May 2013 a flat increase 
of Bs50 was introduced for all. At the current rate of exchange, this corresponds to an annual pension 
of around US$430 and US$340 respectively (Quispe 2013). 
17 This is difficult to quantify. A study by Skinner (2007) in two neighbourhoods of La Paz showed that 
lack of access to Bonosol, the predecessor to Renta Dignidad, was even higher, at around 20 per cent. 
18 The argument that universal benefits received by high-income earners will be channelled back into 
the state budget via personal income tax mechanisms does not apply to Bolivia, where this tax does not 
exist. 
19 Official figures from the Bolivian Office of National Statistics show that extreme poverty decreased 
between 2000 and 2009 from 45 to 26.6 per cent. The Gini index also shows a reduction in inequality: 
from 63 in 2000 to 50 in 2009. The introduction of the universal social pension almost certainly 
contributed to this reduction, although there have been other, smaller and targeted transfers introduced 
for schoolchildren and for new mothers. It is thought that rapid economic growth, increased 
employment and the introduction of minimum wages have also contributed to reduced poverty and 
inequality (León 2008; INE 2013). 
20 Since Bolivia experienced an annual inflation rate of over 11 per cent in 2007 and 2008, the failure to 
increase the value of the Renta Dignidad benefit represented a significant reduction in its real value. 
Inflation fell to 4.5 per cent by 2012 (World Bank 2013).  
